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Book Reviews
The Communist Trials And The American Tradition.
By John Somerville. New York. Cameron Associates, Inc.,
1956. Pp. 256. $3.50.
John Somerville, student, teacher, and Doctor of Philosophy, spent two years in Russia (on a Cutting Fellowship)
in the late thirties studying how the Soviets put the philosophy of Communism to work. As a result of that experience, one would gather, from what he says in his introductory chapter, that he has devoted the rest of his life to
pottering intellectually in that ragweed garden of thought
which traces its unholy seeds to the briefcase of that renegade Hegelian, Karl Marx. Mr. Somerville has written a
number of books and innumerable articles on philosophy
in general and communism in particular, worked for
UNESCO and lectured at several "name" universities in
this country. He knows his way around.
Several years ago, after addressing a teachers' meeting
in Philadelphia on the subject of civil liberties, he was
taken into a lounge by two young men who wanted to talk
business. One was a leader of the Pennsylvania Communist Party and the other was his attorney. The former
had been indicted under the Smith Act.' He wanted help.
He wanted Mr. Somerville to give testimony, in the capacity
of a non-Communist expert witness, on the teachings of
Marx, Lenin, and Stalin as to the use of violence as a
method of achieving desirable results. Mr. Somerville
thought things over, and his liberalism got the better of
him. He agreed, and thus found himself in a United States
District Court in Philadelphia on July 21, 1954. The major
portion of this book is absorbed in the story of his testimony at that trial (in which, it should be noted, all defendants were found guilty) and a criticism of the way it was
handled by the judge and prosecuting attorney. The remainder contains a general criticism of all Smith Act convictions of Communists, a discussion of the two subsequent
1

18U. S. C. A. Sec. 2385 (1951).
SOMERVLLE, 16-22, describing how the appetite for witch hunt doth grow
by what it feeds on. His own justification for getting into -the anti-witch
hunt act appears on p. 23:
'

"It appeared and appears very clear to me that if ever there comes

a time in this country when the citizen who possesses special knowledge
relating ,to some public issue is afraid to come forward and place it at
the disposal of a judge and twelve jurors in a courtroom, justice will
be dead and the moral meaning of this country will have vanished."
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trials in which Mr. Somerville testified,' full text and
analysis of the indictments in each of the three trials, and
an amusing little chapter devoted to his lop-sided correspondence with Representative Howard W. Smith (D. Va.),
whose name the Alien Registration Act bears. But this is
a book about ideas, and no effort at creating a table of contents can do it justice. Mr. Somerville's style is a model of
clarity. His approach to the incredibly difficult intellectual problem of Smith Act prosecutions is novel and, in
some ways, convincing. While his annotations and citations
leave something to be desired, particularly from the standpoint of those whose legal training has made them hungry
for endless documentation, the inclusion of the indictments
is an immeasurable asset, and the index is studiously
complete.
Mr. Somerville's approach is neither constitutional, nor
historical. It is utterly, and often infuriatingly, logical.
Every proposition is, to borrow the terminology of the
sailor, "wormed, parcelled, and served" in major premise,
minor premise, and conclusion. The whole book is entwined
by the endless, seamless web of pure deductive reasoning.
Unhappily, several of the premises are invalid, to my mind,
and, even if not, the ultimate conclusion which is made so
simple and simon pure by hothouse deduction is so glaringly oblivious of history and of historical, inductive reasoning as to insult the intelligence of anyone with a good
education and an inquiring mind. In this no man's land
between the individual's absolute right to express any
belief and the government's absolute right to prosecute any
criminal attempt or act, arguments are long, "life short,
judgment difficult". This book presents one argument
brilliantly. Too brilliantly, one might say.
That argument is essentially this: the Smith Act makes
it a crime to knowingly belong to a conspiracy which advocates the violent overthrow of the Federal government by
force and violence as speedily as circumstances will permit.
In prosecuting members of the Communist Party under
this Act, the government has relied, after proof of noninnocent membership, solely upon the writings of the
leaders of the Communist school of philosophy to establish
its case. There was never any proof of overt acts of violence
even amounting to a breach of the peace. "In all these trials
the prosecuting authorities came into court not with caches
of guns or bombs to show the jury but with stacks of books.
*The last was Blumberg v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 269 (D. C. E. D.
Pa., 1956).
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There is not a single exhibit of military plans but there
is quotation after quotation from the teaching of Marx,
Engels, Lenin, and Stalin."4 As to what is in these books,
it can only be said that
no matter how many passages can be found
which talk about violence, no matter how horrendous
they may sound when taken out of context and read
in isolation, . . . the question always remains: In the
teachings of this school, when, under what conditions,
is this violence to come about? And the answer is
always the same: This school teaches that this violence
will come about only in a revolutionary situation. And
these teachings define the revolutionary situation
clearly and emphatically as one in which governmental
processes have already broken down to a degree making normal balloting impossible and where a revolutionary step has majority support."'
As to when the decision of a "revolutionary situation"
exists, the teachings of the school require that it be made
on the basis of "objective conditions".' Finally, the Communist Party is not unalterably opposed to peaceful transition. Thus, it follows that the Communist Party doctrinally
advocates a violent revolution on the same basis as did the
signers of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, and as would any normally intellegent person picked
at random from any American street corner. For this there
can be no criminal conviction without a total destruction
of our traditional system of civil liberties, so carefully nurtured for something less than two centuries, for the action
advocated by Communist dogma is not "criminal" according to our beliefs about the rights of free men.
Mr. Somerville's basic contention, then, is that the advocated revolution is one which will never come off until
government is ossified and the majority are ready to fight.
This is strong stuff, from a man who knows his way around,
who at least had enough sense never to get mixed up in the
Party, even in the thirties when, as some of the cry-babies
would have us believe, failure to join a cell was certain to
result in one's being cut by his peers. It is a proposition
unnerving even to one who has a moderate understanding
'SomEviL,
44.
Ibid, 113.
Or, as government counsel put it on cross examination: "Now, you mean,
what you are saying is that the Communist Party decides [when a revolutionary situation exists], but they don't decide unless they are right?"
Ibid, 90.
8
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of Marxism, in both its malignant and non-cancerous forms.
If what he says is so, why has the proposition been largely
ignored at the judicial and other atmospheric levels in this
Smith Act hurricane? Evidently because precious few
people really believe it with the unswerving conviction that
Mr. Somerville holds, and perhaps because some who would
believe it are afraid to let anyone know about it.
It would be unfair to his reserved style to suggest that
he has an axe to grind, though his shoddy treatment by the
prosecution on the matter of his qualification as an expert
might ruffle the serenity of Job. The government rather
stupidly maintained that Mr. Somerville was unqualified
simply because he was a non-Communist, evidently on the
premise that only Party members and the government
could know what are the teachings of the Marxist school.
When he restricts his gunning to the concrete skeet
range of the trial court, his accuracy is commendable and
his score high, but when he journeys off into the marsh
of American historical traditions and the fen of constitutional law, the soft footing plays hob with his aim. It is
quite possible that, as Mr. Somerville suggests, the government presented a bad case to the jury, that the passages it
selected from its Appalachia of books to prove its own contentions about the doctrine of force and violence, when read
in context, are as harmless as he contends. And the policy
of trying people on a criminal indictment, not for what
they actually believe, but for what they are supposed to
believe because they admittedly follow a certain named
philosophical school is a matter worthy of the strongest
criticism. To nail the teachings of any philosophy to a
board is an elusive task, but to try to tell a jury what Communism teaches is nigh impossible, since the orthodox,
hypothetical system of Marx has been converted and interpreted into a creed of conduct under all situations by
the Bolsheviks7 - they have made it a chameleon with
which to morally justify their every act.
I I have used the term interchangeably with Communist. At the time of
the Russian Revolution there were two schools of orthodox Marxism (1) the
Mensheviks, or Social-Democratic, who were the passive or determinist
group, willing to compromise with existing government and co-operate in
the Dumas, content in the faith of the inevitability of capitalist downfall,
and (2) the Bolsheviks, led by V. I. Lenin, who were the revolutionaries,
or activists willing to compromise with no one, except to gain a short-term
advantage. The members of the various national Communist Parties, all
of whom look to Moscow for orders, are the heirs of Bolshevik interpretation of Marx and Engels. They are the Leninist or Stalinist stripe of
Marxist. Today's communists (with a small "c") are principally those
anti-Soviet Marxist thinkers who trace their philosophy to the Mensheviks,
or to the Bolshevik-who-lost, Leon Trotsky.
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"Another consideration that stands out very plainly
is that if judges and juries are to be asked to decide
these matters they will have to be educated and trained
far more thoroughly in a mastery of the literature of
the fields concerned. And if expert witnesses are to be
called in to supply what is lacking, they will have to
be given far more time and leeway to do the complex
job required."
This is no criticism of the jury system but one of the prosecution system in the jury trial concept. It is rather absurd
to believe that the average auto mechanic can answer intelligently the question of what are the strictures of Communism on the employment of force against government,
and it is certainly true that many of our trial judges don't
know much more about Communism than what they read
in the papers. The suggestions on the use of expert witnesses are but a restatement of the hoary complaint of all
experts that they don't like being handled by lawyers. But
so much for the policy of trial on the basis the government
has chosen to put it.
To seek justification for Communist teachings on the
"right of revolution", whatever they may be, in the utterances of Thomas Jefferson and the spirit of the American
Revolution is what H. L. Mencken would have called
"palpable nonsense". Jefferson was a forefather whose
credentials are open to question. Regardless of what the
contestants in our annual 4th of July declamation derby
may say in pompous efforts to honor his ghost, he was a
radical in his own time and would be one today. But, be
that as it may, for all his absurd ideas on man's freedom,
he was at least willing to "play the game"; that is, he
fervently believed that all political action was to take place
within a context of representative republicanism, that the
principal aim of revolution was to assure that republicanism. The Bolshevik revolution has no such aim; its
purpose is to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat and
the extinction, rather than representation, of the middle
class and other property owners, so that transition into the
utopia of communism will be easier. Even before the revolution gets rolling, the Bolsheviks refuse to "play the game".
Curiously enough, while Karl Marx's system of classical
economics and the theory of history which he imposed on
top of it stress that the entire process of capitalist crisis,
revolution, dictatorship and the ultimate "withering away"
of the state are all inevitable, both he and his Soviet
8 SOMERVILLE, 181.
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legatees, Lenin and Stalin, emphasize, with varying stress,
that it is the duty of every true Communist to devote himself to the acceleration of that inevitable process; that,
disregarding the question whether a revolutionary situation
exists, every Communist must work toward a revolutionary
goal. So, even if it is believed that a "peaceful transition"
is possible through reforms in, say, the United States, the
Communist must keep plugging toward the big coup. "The
revolutionary will accept a reform in order to use it as an
aid in combining legal work with illegal work, to intensify,
under its cover, the illegal work for the revolutionary
preparation of the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie."' The Bolshevik is not entitled to the same benefit
of doubt as to his notions on revolution as is Jefferson because he won't even play Jefferson's game of football.
There are two main reasons why the American Revolution and its Declaration of Independence provide no historical justification for Mr. Somerville's definition of "revolutionary situation". First, there is no common ground of
objectives between the events of our tangle with the
English and any Communist revolt. Ours was a luxurious
revolution, an insurrection for the benefit of private property. Sparked mostly by the cupidity of those Yankee merchants who resented the King's hand dipping into their
purses and fanned by a combination of English traditions
about taxation and representation and a batch of translations from the French on the rights of humanity, our main
complaint was that neither Parliament nor the crown would
play the same game with us that they played in East Anglia.
But a Communist revolution is an attack on any purse
worth the grabbing and a denial of every rule in the game
of representative government. It offers confiscation and
dictatorship first, then no private holdings beyond wife,
bed and board, and no government at all. Second, there
must be a contrast of the personalities involved. The signers
of the Declaration, and those who fought in the Revolution
lived responsible, productive, constructive lives before and
after the fight. But who are the members of the Communist
Party? Men whose livelihood is a foment of ugly situations
9 STALIN, FOUNDATIONS OF LEININISM (Little Lenin Library vol. 18, International Publishers, New York, 1939), 104. "Tactics change according to
flow and ebb [of the revolutionary tide]." See ibid, 92, 93. This is a classic
statement of Bolshevik strategy: cooperate when necessary, but as soon as
trouble starts, be quick to take advantage of it. The lesson is clear enough.
Communists, regardless of their professed "revolutionary situation" requirements, thrive on the destruction of efforts to compromise a troubled situafrom the
tion. The pattern has remained unchanged for 50 years struggles in the old Dumas to the strife in the Middle East.
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and destruction of peaceful compromise - in short, the
creation of the revolutionary situation. The Party is no
place for men of divided loyalties or inquiring minds; it is
a home for devoted and desperate men. If it is as harmless
as Mr. Somerville implies, why didn't he join? Surely he
could have immeasurably advanced his studies of Marxism
in action. The fact is that he knows the Party is no place
for the merely curious. This is as true of the Party in the
United States today as it was of Lenin's underground cabal
fifty years ago. Lenin wrote in 1902:
"If we begin with the solid foundation of a strong
organization of revolutionists, we can guarantee the
stability of the movement as a whole, and carry out the
aims of both Social-Democracy and of trade unionism.
If, however, we begin with a wide workers' organization, supposed to be most 'accessible' to the masses,
when as a matter of fact it will be most accessible to
the gendarmes, and will make the revolutionists most
accessible to the police, we shall neither achieve the
aims of Social-Democracy or trade unionism, . . .the
organization must consist chiefly of persons engaged
in revolution as a profession, . . ."10
As Mr. Somerville points out,1 Lenin hated terrorists and
minority revolutionists; but he wanted shock troops, a true
vanguard, and not a discussion group.
Mr. Somerville's criticism of the Dennis" case, at both
the Appellate and Supreme Court levels is based on his implacable belief that the teachings of the Party do not call
for the necessary use of violence, that these teachings recognize the "possibilities of peaceful, lawful success, and that
this doctrine (Marxism- Leninism) furthermore points out
that these possibilities exist in this country in the present

period,

.

. .,,'

This peaceful success, the possibility of which

he speaks, will, of course, come about when all private
property is voluntarily rendered up to the state and the
officers of government abdicate in favor of a Communist
dictatorship. Again, "palpable nonsense". At any rate, his
objection to this case and all other cases in its line is that
10

LENiN, WHAT Is To BE DoNE (Little Lenin Library vol. 4, International
Publishers, New York 1929), 112, 116.
n,, 'We are not Blanquists; we are not in favor of seizure of power by a
minority'." SOmEaVILLA, 26; see also 83, 84.
States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201 (2d Cir., 1950) and Dennis v.
2United
United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951). These were the appeals of the ten
top Communists from the first successful prosecution of Communists under
the Smith Act.

ISOMERVILL, 140.
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it "gives judicial sanction to the distorted, 'popular' picture
of Communist teachings as a body of doctrine in which
there is no recognition of any possibility of success by lawful or peaceful means"."' His legal argument is that there
was insufficient evidence to sustain the government's side,
that no reasonable (i.e., logical) man could have returned
a guilty verdict. Thus he steps unwittingly into the complex legal area of directed verdicts and from there to the
pot-holes of constitutional law (for no criticism of the
Supreme Court's handling of the Dennis case can safely
ignore the precise issues covered by the various Justices). ,
His arguments are better directed against the system permitting prosecution of this type than against subsequent
appellate sustention of the verdicts. What is relentlessly
logical to one man is not always so to his neighbor. For that
reason we give the man in the jury box plenty of mental
elbow room. To conclude that the government didn't
present any evidence from which a normal juryman might
decide in its favor is too much to swallow. But one might
be receptive to the idea that, from the welter of quotes and
misquotes dumped before juries in any of these cases it is
not bizarre to conclude that the evidence is so ponderous
and the method of its presentation so confusing as to preclude any rational conclusions one way or the other about
the teachings. But there is no feasible alternative. The
basic difficulty lies in the government's method of prosecuting these cases; yet, as long as Congress condones it, the
judiciary is powerless to change the rules of the game. An
additional complication is the undeniable pressure on the
juror for the return of a guilty verdict, and the pressure on
judges not to tamper with that verdict in the absence of a
clear showing of circumstances preventing anything approximating a fair trial. The kind of trial the Communists
treated themselves to in the Dennis case requires no comment. The area is one of wretching complexity, legally and
morally, if not logically. Regardless of what Mr. Somerville may think about the compelling logic of his thesis, it
is no isolated, one shot stand for criticizing the ultimate
judicial result in Dennis. The logician, and that is the only
post that can be assigned Mr. Somerville in this discussion,
11Loc. cit., supra.
13I have purposely refrained from getting into such arguments because
the author overlooks them and, anyway, they have been exhaustively
reviewed in numerous legal periodicals. A short, concise, objective comment
may be found in SCHWARTZ, AmEniCAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW (1955), Ch. X,
reviewed, 16 Md. L. Rev. 266, 272-3 (1956), by Judge William C. Coleman.
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has his place in a court of law, but his is not to be the only
place.
The problem of the ultimate wisdom of prosecuting
Party members in our present manner still haunts us. It
was haunting Mr. Justice Frankfurter when he voted to
sustain the Dennis convictions:
"It is a sobering fact that in sustaining the conviction before us we can hardly escape restriction on the
interchange of ideas.
"It is not for us to decide how we would adjust the
clash of interests which this case presents were the
primary responsibility for reconciling it ours. Congress
has determined that the danger created by advocacy of
overthrow justifies the ensuing restriction on freedom
of speech. The determination was made after due deliberation, and the seriousness of the congressional
purpose is attested by the volume of legislation passed
to effectuate the same ends.
"All the Court says is that Congress was not forbidden by the Constitution to pass this enactment and
that a prosecution under it may be brought against a
conspiracy such as the one before us.
"Civil liberties draw at best only limited strength
from legal guaranties. Preoccupation by our people
with the constitutionality, instead of with the wisdom,
of legislation or of executive action is preoccupation
with a false value. Even those who would most freely
use the judicial brake on the democratic process by invalidating legislation that goes deeply against their
grain, acknowledge, at least by paying lip service, that
constitutionality does not exact a sense of proportion or
the sanity of humor or an absence of fear. Focusing
attention on constitutionality tends to make constitutionality synonymous with wisdom."1 6
Or perhaps Lord Coleridge had something very near the
answer when he remarked that "It is far more important
the law should be administered with absolute integrity than
that in this case or that the law should be a good law or
a bad one.""
RoGER D. REDDEN*
n. 12, cone. op. 517, 549, 550, 552, 555.
"Attributed by MEINCKEN in A N~w DIonIONAY oF QuoTATioNs (4th
Printing, 1952) 661, to his opinion in Regina v. Ramsay (1893).
* Class of 1957, University of Maryland School of Law; Editor, Volume
XVII.
16Supra,

